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INTRODUCTION 
In 2016, refugees poured across international borders in record 
numbers.1 Yet, as the horrific pictures from Myanmar, Syria, and 
Somalia demonstrate, escaping from the injustice and economic 
hardships imposed by failed states remains extremely difficult. 
Refugees must take enormous personal risks to find safe havens, often 
while leaving behind beloved family members and vibrant social 
networks. Joseph Blocher and Mitu Gulati’s Article, A Market for 
Sovereign Control, provides an opportunity to reconsider how best to 
improve the lives of individuals stuck in poorly governed areas and also 
to think more broadly about how to encourage good government in 
other countries.2 These are vital questions because, as Blocher and 
Gulati observe, the stakes are so high.3 People and nations continue to 
fight (and die) to protect territory, cross borders, and alter 
geographies.4  
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1. “The Syrian refugee crisis is the largest refugee crisis since the Second World War.” E.
Tendayi Achiume, Syria, Cost-Sharing, and the Responsibility to Protect Refugees, 100 MINN. L. 
REV. 687, 688 (2015). Many European countries are processing record numbers of refugees. See 
Madison Park, Europe Received Record-Breaking 1.3 Million Asylum Applications in 2015,  
CNN (Aug. 3, 2016, 7:33 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2016/08/03/europe/europe-record-refugees 
[https://perma.cc/G7ME-N96G]. 
2. Joseph Blocher & Mitu Gulati, A Market for Sovereign Control, 66 DUKE L.J. 797, 799–
800 (2017). 
3. Id. at 799.
4. Id. 
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Blocher and Gulati’s basic insight is that it is too hard for 
populations who feel ill-served by their countries to exit.5 Thus, rather 
than waiting for oppressed people to scrape their way into countries 
with better governance, Blocher and Gulati argue in favor of bringing 
better governance to oppressed people. They would accomplish this by 
making international borders less sacred and easier to change.6 
Specifically, they propose that a nation’s control over its territory 
should become subject to a liability rule rather than a property rule if 
it discriminates against one of its constituent regions.7 Under Blocher 
and Gulati’s proposal, a nation that denies equal treatment to a local 
area would lose the ability to prevent secession. The disfavored region 
could elect to strike out on its own or join up with a friendlier 
neighboring country. However, the authors also insist that 
governments receive compensation for their lost land—compensation 
that would be set by a global “market” for sovereign territory.8  
This is bold, inventive work. Blocher and Gulati’s ideas make 
three enormous contributions to scholarship on sovereignty. First, the 
authors illuminate a glaring hole in modern international law: there is 
currently no sound mechanism to help regions that are substantially 
underserved by their parent nation, but not quite oppressed. Second, 
the authors articulate a novel way to improve the lives of people in 
regions surrounded by the “wrong” border. Their proposal is truly 
elegant. Rather than relying on creaky international institutions or UN 
peacekeepers for assistance, Blocher and Gulati want to harness the 
power of markets and self-interested competition to improve the lives 
of the politically powerless. Almost all previous reform efforts have 
focused on public-law solutions rather than private-law mechanisms. 
Finally, Blocher and Gulati show that their market for sovereignty can 
encourage the spread of good government without the deprivations of 
war or the failures of colonialism. By setting up a quasi-market for 
repressed territories, the authors’ proposal encourages all nations to 
treat their regions with dignity and respect under the law.  
A Market for Sovereign Control does leave some intriguing 
questions unanswered. To start, some critics have raised concerns that 
the authors are a bit nonchalant about the granular details of their 
proposal. What counts as a “region”? What role will international 
 
 5. Id. at 804 (“[S]ome populated regions are in the ‘wrong’ countries . . . .”). 
 6. Id. at 801. 
 7. Id. at 803. 
 8. Id.  
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institutions play in the scheme? How will we accurately value the 
places that choose to secede? While these are certainly important 
questions, small issues of practicality should not derail an innovative 
idea. The law, for example, has put values on far stranger things than 
sovereign territory.9 Pushing aside these second-order questions of 
workability, however, reveals a deeper worry. Although Blocher and 
Gulati’s proposal has great merit, the success of their plan seems to 
turn on an assumption that nations will act in a rational, value-
maximizing fashion. But even a cursory review of recent history shows 
that is not always the case. In particular, the authors need to consider 
more fully that disputes over land are often about far more than money 
and access to resources. They are about emotion, honor, revenge, and 
the echoes of history. Given that, how will this proposal—based largely 
on economic theory and market mechanisms—fare when confronted 
with actual human institutions fueled by politics and irrational human 
desires? It seems all too plausible that a repressive nation, pushed to 
accept treasure in return for the loss of its land and sovereignty, may 
react with anger rather than casual acceptance. If that happens, what 
becomes of the peoples Blocher and Gulati seek to help? Who will 
protect them? Simply changing a border does not actually remove 
vulnerable minorities from the reach of their former tormentors. 
Unless a committed enforcer emerges from the mists, bigger and 
stronger nations will still have the power to make life hellish for any 
regions that attempt to secede.  
To sum up: Blocher and Gulati have proposed a sweeping vision 
for the future of international law and their proposal will surely 
generate important new discussions about whether private law can 
better solve the problem of good governance. However, to show that 
their proposal can effect significant change, the authors must gather 
more evidence that offering a nation monetary compensation for land 
(and peoples) has the power to bury generational disputes about who 
owns contested geographies.  
I.  BUYING SOVEREIGNTY 
A Market for Sovereign Control is exciting, audacious, and 
insightful. While Blocher and Gulati’s case for selling sovereignty is not 
 
 9. Courts and state statutes routinely allow recovery for the loss of limbs, defamation, pain 
and suffering, loss of consortium, invasion of privacy, and many other injuries that have no 
conventional market value. See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 11-108(a)(2)(i) 
(LexisNexis 2013). 
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without real weaknesses, they mount a formidable challenge to some 
of the calcified thinking that has prevented innovation and the reform 
of global institutions. In particular, they critique the failure of 
international law to assist mildly oppressed peoples, propose new rules 
to govern border changes, and show that international law could do 
more to encourage the spread of good government. 
A.  The Hole in International Law  
The first important contribution of A Market for Sovereign 
Control is that it reveals a peculiar gap between how global institutions 
treat severely oppressed places and how they treat moderately 
oppressed places.10 When a country commits some brutal form of 
oppression against one of its constituent regions, international bodies 
generally respond with appropriate power and concern.11 In these 
instances, the law recognizes the rights of the affected area to secede, 
the nations of the world often intervene, and aid dollars flow to the 
subjugated people.12 But what happens in the far more common 
scenario where a parent nation bullies and harasses a region, but the 
actions do not quite amount to genocide? The authors build a case that 
international law provides no real mechanism to assist regions that are 
harassed, denied equal treatment, and starved of adequate political 
representation.13 The law, for example, grants them no right of 
remedial secession and global armies rarely intervene to fix problems 
of institutionalized discrimination.  
Blocher and Gulati believe this is unjust. As they point out, there 
are many people around the world who would be safer, happier, and 
wealthier if surrounded by different borders and governed by different 
leaders.14 But the law does nothing for them. Instead, the current 
 
 10. Id. at 803, 806–07, 814. 
 11. This is not to say that the international community always responds as quickly as it should 
to mass atrocities. See generally SAMANTHA POWER, A PROBLEM FROM HELL: AMERICA AND 
THE AGE OF GENOCIDE 329–390 (2002) (arguing that America has, at best, a mixed record of 
acting to stop genocide).  
 12. For more on remedial secession, see LEE C. BUCHHEIT, SECESSION: THE LEGITIMACY 
OF SELF-DETERMINATION 220 (1978); Michael P. Scharf, Earned Sovereignty: Juridical 
Underpinnings, 31 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 373, 380–84 (2003). 
 13. Blocher & Gulati, supra note 2 at 813–14; see also Joseph Blocher & Mitu Gulati,  
Ukraine and Russia—You Break It, You Bought It, ERIC POSNER (Feb. 4, 2015), 
http://ericposner.com/guest-post-ukraine-and-russia-you-break-it-you-bought-it [https://perma.
cc/83PM-T4FZ] [hereinafter Blocher & Gulati, Ukraine and Russia] (arguing that current 
international law provides moderately oppressed countries “a disappointing menu of options”). 
 14. Blocher & Gulati, supra note 2, at 804–05. 
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system leaves people from poorly governed regions to pursue self-help 
remedies without the sword and shield provided by international law. 
The mildly oppressed can engage in the political process, choose to 
revolt against their parent countries, or attempt to find refuge in 
nations that will have them. But according to Blocher and Gulati, these 
self-help “solutions” to the problem of bad governance are wildly 
inefficient. Despised minorities have little leverage in politics, violent 
uprisings rarely succeed, and immigration, they write, “is difficult—
particularly for the poor, weak, or oppressed—and breaks up families 
and communities.”15 Rather than leave these regions adrift, Blocher 
and Gulati argue that global institutions should provide some 
mechanism to assist communities that want greater voice in their 
governance. If A Market for Sovereign Control succeeds at nothing 
else, it is worth reading because of this clear-eyed insistence that more 
needs to be done for people who live under misbehaving governments 
and whom the law has untapped potential to help.  
B.  Helping International Law Help Others 
Blocher and Gulati’s most important contribution is that they 
articulate a paradigm shifting proposal to improve the lives of peoples 
in poorly governed countries. This is a real accomplishment, in part 
because international law is muddled on this point. Early in the Article, 
the authors show that a tension between two foundational concepts of 
international law makes it extremely difficult to excavate solutions on 
behalf of the mildly oppressed.16 They explain, correctly, that the time-
honored principle of territorial integrity grants nations near-absolute 
control over their borders. Central governments, for example, 
routinely reject boundary changes proposed by neighboring states or 
internal secessionist movements.17 At the same time, however, the 
increasingly relevant principle of self-determination demands that all 
peoples have the opportunity to choose their own national affiliations, 
govern themselves, and develop free political institutions.18 The 
 
 15. Id. at 801. 
 16. Id. at 799 (“The challenge is designing a framework that respects, to the degree possible, 
both popular sovereignty and nations’ territorial integrity.”). 
 17. For example, Finland blocked the Åland Islands from becoming part of Sweden, showing 
how a state may exercise its right to territorial integrity over the objections of the local people. 
Steve R. Fisher, Towards “Never Again”: Searching for a Right to Remedial Secession Under 
Extant International Law, 22 BUFF. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 261, 274–75 (2015). 
 18. Blocher & Gulati, supra note 2, at 811–13 (explaining, in broad strokes, the principle of 
self-determination). 
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difficulty is this: any proposal that calls for increased intervention in 
repressive countries probably undermines territorial sovereignty, while 
any solution that disregards the suffering in poorly treated regions 
ignores the right of self-determination.  
Blocher and Gulati manage to thread the needle by importing 
property theory into the realm of international law. In a nutshell, their 
idea is that a nation’s control over its borders should become subject 
to a liability rule rather than a property rule if the nation discriminates 
against one of its constituent regions.19 Under Blocher and Gulati’s 
framework, a nation that denies equal treatment to a local area would 
lose control over its borders; it could no longer prevent the secession 
of a disaffected area. However, the authors also insist that the 
government receive compensation for its lost land—compensation that 
would be set by a global “market” for sovereign territory.20 Such 
compensation, the authors explain, “could take a range of forms, from 
lump sum financial transfers to land swaps and military and political 
obligations.”21  
For example, imagine that the Hmong people of northern 
Thailand believe their lives would improve under a different 
government. Under the current legal order, the Hmong have few 
options—the national government of Thailand can quash any proposed 
border change, no matter how reasonable. Blocher and Gulati argue 
that this should not always be so. They contend that if Thailand has 
denied the Hmong meaningful access to the government, then the 
Hmong’s desire for self-determination should trump the Thais’ 
absolute control over the region. Under their proposal, the Hmong 
region could exit Thailand with the support of the international 
community, provided that it compensates the government in Bangkok 
for the loss of territory.  
If all this were not radical enough, Blocher and Gulati further 
argue that regions have a quasi-property right to approve a sale of their 
sovereignty to the highest bidder.22 Thus, the Hmong could purchase 
their independence directly from Thailand, or they could solicit offers 
for their sovereignty from other nation states. The authors envision 
that neighboring countries like Laos, China, and Myanmar might all 
lodge bids with Bangkok to bring the Hmong lands under their 
 
 19. Id. at 807. 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id. at 817–18. 
 22. Id. at 818–19. 
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sovereign control. To safeguard the principle of self-determination in 
this framework, Blocher and Gulati suggest that a supermajority of the 
voters in a transacted area endorse any final transfer.23 Thus, the 
Hmong could not end up as part of a Chinese province without 
significant support of voters. 
It is worth pausing for a moment to admire Blocher and Gulati’s 
considerable achievement. Their scheme provides overlooked and 
underrepresented peoples with a new exit option. The power to leave 
would endow entire regions with the opportunity to live under police 
forces of their own making and courts of their choosing. Just as 
importantly, Blocher and Gulati do not ignore the incentives of the 
parent nation. The compensation provided by the liability rule could 
work to real effect—it gives a reluctant parent nation a significant 
inducement to let disgruntled regions find their own way. Why fight to 
prolong a relationship that is not working for either party when there 
is an opportunity to change course and reap significant financial 
rewards?  
Finally, it is worth pointing out explicitly that Blocher and Gulati’s 
idea accomplishes all this without upsetting the broad contours of 
international law. The principle of territorial integrity remains intact; 
so long as a nation grants all of its people equal treatment under the 
law, its borders remain secure. And, as mentioned above, the proposal 
also respects the right to self-determination. No region can be pushed 
toward independence or transferred to the control of a different 
sovereign without its consent.  
C.  Spreading Good Government 
Another strength of Blocher and Gulati’s proposal is that it has 
the potential to improve the lives of peoples well beyond the transacted 
region. Borrowing from the ideas of Charles Tiebout,24 A Market for 
Sovereign Control shows that the mere threat of border changes and 
interjurisdictional competition for sovereign lands would quickly 
induce at least some governments to treat disfavored areas with more 
respect.25 The reasoning is easy to follow. Right now, roguish nations 
 
 23. Id. at 817 (“Consistent with the principle of self-determination, the population of a 
region would have the right to vote on whether to solicit, accept, or refuse governance bids from 
other nations.”). 
 24. See Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON. 416, 418 
(1956) (describing the benefits of interjurisdictional competition for citizens). 
 25. Blocher & Gulati, supra note 2, at 835. 
CLOWNEY IN PRINTER FINAL (TRACK CHANGES).DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 2/1/2017  12:29 PM 
26 DUKE LAW JOURNAL ONLINE [Vol. 66:19 
have little incentive to respond to the protests and complaints of 
minority populations. As long as the parent nations’ behavior does not 
tip into genocide (or some other form of severe oppression), they can 
exploit and humiliate their constituent regions with few 
consequences.26 An active market for sovereign control, however, 
would force misbehaving nations into a difficult choice. They can either 
grant new rights to previously disfavored peoples or risk losing chunks 
of their territory to sovereign bidders who may win the approval of the 
disaffected region. 
Although this application of interjurisdictional competition in the 
international context would be novel, the concept is not. The behavior 
of cities, for example, has long been constrained by the ability of 
residents to pick up and move to nearby suburbs.27 Detroit, for 
example, cannot increase taxes unreasonably or its residents will 
decide to move across the border to neighboring Dearborn, Grosse 
Pointe, or Oak Park. A host of empirical studies support the basic 
theory that competition between jurisdictions for residents creates a 
constant pressure to design legal regimes that reflect local citizen’s 
preferences.28 Thus, as long as the threat of exit remains credible and 
the costs of switching between sovereigns are not prohibitive, Blocher 
and Gulati’s proposal should achieve the same salubrious effects at the 
international level. The authors’ idea is, in effect, a method of scaling 
good government that uses market mechanisms rather than conquest 
as the fulcrum for change. By pushing the most abusive nations to 
abandon their worst practices, Blocher and Gulati’s scheme has the 
potential to eliminate much human suffering, and that makes the idea 
worth pursuing. 
 
 26. Id. at 813. 
 27. See Wallace E. Oates, The Many Faces of the Tiebout Model, in THE TIEBOUT MODEL 
AT FIFTY: ESSAYS IN PUBLIC ECONOMICS IN HONOR OF WALLACE OATES 35 (William A. Fischel 
ed., 2006) (stating that “[t]he conventional wisdom is that Tiebout sorting is most likely in a 
metropolitan setting where an individual who works in the center city (or elsewhere in the area) 
will have a wide choice among communities in which to live”). 
 28. See, e.g., Vicki Been, “Exit” as a Constraint on Land Use Exactions: Rethinking the 
Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 473, 521–23 (1991) (summarizing the 
empirical evidence); Keith Dowding, Peter John & Stephen Biggs, Tiebout: A Survey of the 
Empirical Literature, 31 URB. STUD. 767, 775–79 (1994) (surveying two-hundred articles on 
empirical tests of the Tiebout hypothesis). 
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II.  SELLING SOVEREIGNTY 
Blocher and Gulati’s Article makes many important contributions 
to the current debates about international governance, refugees, and 
the right of self-determination. It is an extremely valuable offering—
well-researched, well-written, thought provoking, and full of 
captivating hypotheticals. But the authors’ focus on economic theory 
over the gritty details of politics and human behavior may prove a 
stumbling block for some readers. The easiest critique to launch at 
Blocher and Gulati is that they do not discuss the specifics of their 
proposal in detail.29 A Market for Sovereign Control is one of the few 
modern law review articles that would benefit from more pages 
devoted to legal minutiae. The authors, for example, do not flesh out 
exactly what kind of oppression is sufficient to trigger their liability rule 
or who will make the relevant decisions.30 Moreover, the Article also 
only briefly discusses what constitutes a “region” and does not explain 
how the international community would determine what compensation 
is due to a parent nation in the aftermath of a secession.31 
Blocher and Gulati must find answers to these practical questions 
if their proposal is to move forward. Nevertheless, this review focuses 
on other issues. The authors’ stated goal is not to provide model 
legislation for consideration at the UN, but rather to establish a 
conceptual framework to encourage more transfers of sovereign land.32 
Does the piece meet this more limited goal? While Blocher and 
Gulati’s scheme contains much promise, a few broad issues remain 
tantalizingly unaddressed. First, the authors fail to provide a coherent 
story to explain why there are not more transfers of sovereign territory 
under the current international regime. Second, the authors do not 
address whether a market for sovereign control is really an adequate 
form of exit for regions that have been ill-treated by their parent 
nation. And third, Blocher and Gulati expend little effort defending 
one of their core assumptions: that nations will act as rational wealth-
maximizers in a market for sovereign territory. 
 
 29. The authors openly acknowledge that their article does not provide some essential 
details. Blocher & Gulati, supra note 2, at 822 (“This raises difficult questions of institutional 
design and authority that this [a]rticle does not attempt to answer.”). 
 30. Id. at 821 (discussing the challenge of defining “what kind of oppression is sufficient to 
trigger the liability rule”). 
 31. Id. at 840–41 (briefly discussing what counts as a “region”). 
 32. Id. at 804 (noting that “[a]s with any conceptual framework, we do not expect this 
proposal to translate directly into practice”). 
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A. Why Doesn’t a Market for Sovereignty Already Exist? 
Blocher and Gulati argue that a market for sovereign land would 
have the power to reduce armed conflict, improve governance, and 
protect minority rights. But if swapping sovereignty for cash really 
contains such promise, we should expect nations currently fighting over 
territory to occasionally settle their disputes with negotiated land 
transactions. Such transactions are fully sanctioned under the current 
international order. While traditional law does not recognize the 
liability rule put forth by Blocher and Gulati, it does permit nations to 
engage in voluntary, arms-length bargaining over land.33 For example, 
the United States could purchase large swaths of Canadian territory if 
the governments in Washington and Ottawa could reach a mutually 
agreeable price. In some respects, it is actually easier to buy and sell 
land under current international law than it would be under the 
framework proposed in A Market for Sovereign Control. Blocher and 
Gulati, for example, would only allow transfers if residents in the 
transacted region give their consent—modern international law 
imposes no such restriction.34 Thus, if the Canadian government 
acquiesced, the United States could make Quebec the 51st state, even 
over the vociferous objections of the Québécois. 
Looking at the sweep of evidence assembled in A Market for 
Sovereign Control, it is difficult to conclude that countries seem eager 
to sell land to their neighbors. Blocher and Gulati expend a lot of effort 
demonstrating that nations flog sovereignty-like things: they confer 
servitudes to one another, they lease military bases to foreign powers, 
they transfer territory to foreign investors, and they engage in 
cooperative efforts to build things like canals and ports.35 But these 
grants of quasi-sovereignty seem markedly different than permanently 
surrendering control of land and severing relationships with discrete 
groups of people. In A Market for Sovereign Control, Blocher and 
Gulati mention only a few examples of fulsome transfers of sovereign 
territory, and the cases they rely on—the Louisiana Purchase, the sale 
of the Virgin Islands, the gift of Mumbai from Portugal to Britain, the 
purchase of Hong Kong—all occurred over one hundred years ago.36 
This slight historical record suggests that border changes are more 
 
 33. Id. at 806–10 (showing that nations can acquire territory as they see fit, with no need for 
approval from the transacted peoples). 
 34. Id. at 813 (declaring that “we would require regional approval for cessions”). 
 35. Id. at 801–02. 
 36. Id. at 808–09. 
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fraught than the authors acknowledge. It also complicates their 
argument that sales of sovereign territory will result in Pareto-efficient 
outcomes. It seems that countries either find it difficult to agree on 
price or, more likely, they simply resist the idea that governance can be 
bought and sold. 
In my view, the authors do not focus adequate attention on the 
drought of negotiated transactions. How to explain the lack of transfers 
under the current international order? Blocher and Gulati only 
acknowledge the issue indirectly, indicating that they do not expect 
their framework to get robust use. They state, “[h]opefully a market 
for sovereignty can—even if rarely employed, and even if used just 
once—offer a workable solution to actual problems . . . . Our goal here 
is to add an option, not to ensure that nations frequently employ it.”37 
But this is unsatisfying. What Blocher and Gulati propose will not be 
easy to implement. By their own admission, they are pushing for a 
significant addition to international law. Such schemes do not spring to 
life fully formed, like Athena from the head of Zeus. The global 
community will need to constitute new agencies to oversee and 
administer the secessions of ill-treated regions. Committees will argue 
about rules and make compromises about ambiguities. Treaties may 
need to be signed. Given the time and extraordinary effort required to 
erect any international framework, Blocher and Gulati have the 
obligation to show that their scheme would justify the costs. Based on 
the evidence presented in A Market for Sovereign Control, they have 
not (yet) met that burden.  
B.  Exit and Enforcers 
The easiest defense of A Market for Sovereign Control is that the 
scheme does not solely rely on voluntary transfers. Under Blocher and 
Gulati’s proposal, if a nation fails to provide representation or equal 
treatment to a constituent region, it automatically loses the right to 
prevent a secession and the compensation it is due can be set by an 
international tribunal.38 No meeting of the minds is necessary to 
effectuate a border change. But the possibility of involuntary transfers 
raises a host of other, darker problems. What happens if an ill-treated 
region declares independence by invoking Blocher and Gulati’s 
scheme, but the parent nation refuses to accept a realignment? This is 
 
 37. Id. at 837. 
 38. Id. at 803 (“The parent nation . . . loses the power to forbid a cession but remains entitled 
to compensation set by the market (subject to review by a third party such as the ICJ).”). 
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not just academic conjecture. It is painfully easy to come up with 
examples that might fall into this category: Palestinians in Israel, Kurds 
in Turkey, Turks on Cyprus, Basques in France, Chechens in Russia, 
Serbs in Bosnia, Ambazonians in Cameroon, and Rohingya in 
Myanmar. China alone could see eruptions in Tibet, Taiwan, Hong 
Kong, and the Uyghur homelands. 
Who, exactly, will enforce the claims of these peoples? The 
international community? The purchasing nation? The regions 
themselves? Blocher and Gulati do not say. A Market for Sovereign 
Control would be a stronger offering if the authors sketched, in general 
terms, how they envision disputed cases unfolding. Right now, it is 
difficult to see how a people like the Rohingya or the Chechens can 
escape their (more powerful) antagonists, at least without the backing 
of a muscular enforcer.39 In fact, the only regions that seem poised to 
immediately benefit from Blocher and Gulati’s scheme are the 
ethnically Russian enclaves scattered throughout the former Soviet 
states—they alone have a patron who can pay the mandated 
compensation and then follow up with credible threats of violence if a 
parent nation (Ukraine? Kazakhstan? Estonia? Georgia?) resists a 
secession. Arguably, the moral force underlying Blocher and Gulati’s 
proposal ebbs if their framework is perceived as a tool to consolidate 
the power of rich nations rather than as a means to further the 
liberation of subjugated peoples.  
Even assuming that I have underestimated the number of regions 
that can initially extricate themselves from the grip of discriminatory 
central governments, Blocher and Gulati’s framework may still hit a 
few speedbumps. The success of the authors’ proposal turns on the 
ability to provide regions with a genuine exit option.40 But altering a 
border does not physically remove vulnerable populations from the 
reach of their former tormentors. Establishing an invisible boundary 
between tyrant and the terrorized, without more, accomplishes little. 
Consider two examples. First, in 2011, the black population of Sudan 
overwhelmingly voted to break free from its oppressive central 
 
 39. For a primer on the Rohingya, see generally Maung Zarni & Alice Cowley, The Slow-
Burning Genocide of Myanmar’s Rohingya, 23 PAC. RIM L. & POL’Y J. 683 (2014). And for 
background on the Chechens, see generally Johanna Nichols, The Chechen Refugees, 18 
BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 241 (2000). 
 40. Tiebout models of intra-jurisdictional competition rest on the ability of citizens to reveal 
their preferences through exit. See, e.g., Richard Briffault, Our Localism: Part II—Localism and 
Legal Theory, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 346, 419 (1990) (stating that exit is “pivotal to the efficiency of 
Tiebout’s system”). 
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government and form its own nation, South Sudan.41 The international 
community affirmed this vote and drew new borders upon the map.42 
The government of Sudan, however, has sporadically ignored the 
border change; it continues to harass the South Sudanese people and 
meddle in the affairs of the new nation.43 Life for the South Sudanese 
hardly seems to have improved in the aftermath of independence.44 
Second, in 1999, the people of East Timor voted for independence from 
Indonesia, only for an Indonesian-backed militia to initiate a campaign 
of terror.45 The newly liberated region was saved only when the world 
community intervened and the UN assumed administration of the 
region.46 In this small, Connecticut-sized nation, the peacekeeping 
mission lasted over a decade.47 Is this the template that A Market for 
Sovereign Control envisions?  
Blocher and Gulati might respond that although their proposal is 
not perfect, “[t]he availability of a market solution gives [a] region an 
exit option it did not have before[.]”48 No one is worse off and the 
scheme may occasionally help a marginalized people achieve greater 
 
 41. See Maggie Fick, South Sudan: 5 Key Questions Answered, CHRISTIAN SCI.  
MONITOR (July 21, 2011), http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Africa/2011/0721/South-Sudan-5-
key-questions-answered/Why-did-the-Republic-of-South-Sudan-secede-from-the-North [https://
perma.cc/JC88-E5TF] (describing the Sudanese government’s consistent marginalization of the 
non-Arab South). 
 42. Jeffrey Gettleman, Struggle Over, Independent South Sudan Rejoices, N.Y. TIMES, July 
10, 2011, at A6 (discussing the involvement of the United States in crafting the treaty between 
North and South Sudan). 
 43. See Hannibal Travis, Genocide, Counterinsurgency, and the Self-Defense of UN Member 
States Before the International Criminal Court, 22 U.C. DAVIS J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 139, 194–97 
(2016); Charlton Doki & Dam Mohamed, “Africa’s Arms Dump”: Following the Trail of Bullets 
in the Sudans, GUARDIAN (Oct. 2, 2014), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/oct/02/-sp-
africa-arms-dump-south-sudan [https://perma.cc/TVB4-VK92] (discussing reports that the 
Sudanese government supplies arms to rebels fighting in South Sudan). The South Sudanese have 
been no angels in this dispute. Many observers hold them largely responsible for the 2012 crisis 
in Heglig. 
 44. See generally Harjot Dhillon, Lofty Goals in Dire Times: South Sudan’s Obstacles to 
Achieving the New SDGs, 16 SUSTAINABLE DEV. L. & POL’Y 14, 14 (2016) (discussing the political 
and humanitarian challenges in South Sudan). 
 45. Cheah Wui Ling, Forgiveness and Punishment in Post-Conflict Timor, 10 UCLA J. INT’L 
L. & FOREIGN AFF. 297, 304–07 (2005) (describing the violence in the immediate aftermath of 
East Timor’s independence vote). 
 46. Id. at 305–06. 
 47. See UNMIT: The United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste, UNITED NATIONS 
(Nov. 13, 2012), http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/unmit [https://perma.cc/6E2H-
DH9N] (“The United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste completed its mandate on 31 
December 2012.”). 
 48. Blocher & Gulati, supra note 2, at 825. 
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security. And yet, there is a nontrivial danger that their proposal could 
spark increased levels of armed conflict around the globe. It does not 
take much imagination to envision a world where an ill-treated people, 
whose cause is suddenly injected with the righteousness of 
international law, might decide to initiate violence against the central 
government that refuses to allow secession. Blocher and Gulati’s 
framework may also draw outside enforcers into what had been 
regional tensions, thereby risking the spread of new conflicts with 
different peoples and providing a spark for the enlargement of 
disputes.49 I do not believe this critique poses a fundamental challenge 
to Blocher and Gulati’s proposal. It does, however, bring onscreen 
some downside risks of the framework that the authors might consider 
in their future writings. 
C.  Politics and Psychology 
Blocher and Gulati are correct, in my view, to worry that regions 
denied representation by their parent countries need better exit 
options. In A Market for Sovereign Control, the authors ably use the 
tools of markets and economic theory to disrupt current thinking about 
self-determination, the inviolability of borders, and how best to protect 
disfavored minority groups. The discussion, however, would have been 
enriched with a sober focus on international politics and the 
psychology that accompanies questions of sovereign territory. 
Specifically, Blocher and Gulati’s market-based proposal assumes that 
nations are rational actors who seek to maximize their economic 
welfare above other goals. They maintain that parent countries will 
quickly snap up compensation for lost land rather than fight over 
troublesome regions that desire to join another sovereign. This view of 
international affairs seems incomplete. While nations certainly 
respond to monetary incentives, they also sit atop the fault lines of 
history, honor, and vengeance. 
The most obvious complication for Blocher and Gulati’s market is 
that sovereign territory is not a fungible good that can be easily 
replaced. Specific places and landscapes continue to play a hugely 
significant part in the construction of national identities.50 For example, 
 
 49. See Stephen Clowney, Rule of Flesh and Bone: The Dark Side of Informal Property 
Rights, 2015 U. ILL. L. REV. 59, 104–07 (discussing the danger of enforcing one’s own 
entitlements). 
 50. Blocher and Gulati make a glancing reference to this issue. See Blocher & Gulati, supra 
note 2, at 815. 
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it’s difficult to conceive of the United States ever assenting to a sale of 
the Statue of Liberty or Independence Hall, even if the surrounding 
areas become inhabited by some ungovernable minority. These sites 
are too rich with symbolic meaning to relinquish for money, access to 
military bases, or promises to open new markets. “Ordinary” 
landscapes, too, are often seen as integral to the national identity.51 For 
example, idyllic versions of the Western United States and the small 
New England town have, in different contexts, come to symbolize the 
wider nation. This is true all around the globe. In versions of Welsh 
nationalist discourse, for example, “the mountains are seen as the heart 
of the nation, somehow symbolizing a Wales untainted by outside . . . 
influences.”52 And in England, images of the rural landscape reinforce 
ideas about English history and its collective character.53 That territory 
remains so interlaced with the construction of national identity casts 
some dark shadows across Blocher and Gulati’s optimistic vision for a 
market in sovereign territory. In a world where altering boundaries is 
often akin to a betrayal of a people’s history, offering monetary 
compensation for land loss might not provide as strong an incentive as 
Blocher and Gulati hope.54 What politician will accept thirty pieces of 
silver to sanction the loss of territory where national heroes lived, 
battles were won, and prophets lay buried?  
Visions of national honor may also have a warping effect on 
Blocher and Gulati’s proposal. Recall the recent troubles in Crimea. 
The authors have argued that their proposal would have improved 
outcomes in the dispute between Russia and Ukraine.55 Under the 
current legal regime, Russia had every incentive to manufacture unrest 
in Crimea and then use the resulting chaos to justify a “humanitarian” 
military intervention to protect the region’s Russian population. 
According to Blocher and Gulati, a market would have given Russia a 
different and better alternative.56 The Russians could have directed 
their military spending toward a compensation package, which could 
 
 51. See David Storey, Territory and National Identity: Examples from the Former Yugoslavia, 
87 GEOGRAPHY 108, 109–10 (2002). 
 52. Id. at 110. 
 53. See MICHAEL BUNCE, THE COUNTRYSIDE IDEAL: ANGLO-AMERICAN IMAGES OF 
LANDSCAPE 33–34 (1994). 
 54. Storey, supra note 51, at 113 (arguing that for Serbs, relinquishing claims to Kosovo is a 
“betrayal of their own history”). 
 55. Blocher & Gulati, Ukraine and Russia, supra note 13. 
 56. Id. 
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have led to “a voluntary and more legitimate cession.”57 But this vision 
assumes too much. It presumes a Ukrainian politician could accept 
money from Russia for Ukrainian land without incurring the rage of 
the people.58 And it imagines that Russia’s only motivation was to 
control the resources of Crimea. Many observers have argued, 
however, that Russia’s behavior was not driven primarily by economic 
considerations.59 Rather, the point of the Crimea excursion was to 
humiliate the West and punish Ukrainians for electing a pro-European 
government.60 These goals could not have been accomplished through 
a negotiated purchase.  
The most basic problem is this: Blocher and Gulati’s proposal 
allows sales of sovereign land, but it does not make it particularly 
honorable or politically feasible to do so. This hitch is not 
insurmountable, but it requires changing some very sticky norms. 
Consider the ongoing conflict between Britain and Argentina over the 
Falkland Islands. Britain spends enormous sums of money each year to 
defend the Falklands, a group of islands in the South Atlantic Ocean, 
almost eight thousand miles away from London.61 Argentina 
desperately wants to govern the archipelago, which sits off its coast and 
is still home to three thousand people.62 Reason dictates that Britain 
should buy out the inhabitants and sell the territory to Argentina (or 
purchase Argentina’s claim). And yet this seems an impossibility. For 
the British public, the Falklands are the site of a rousing British military 
 
 57. Id. 
 58. See Issac Chotiner, How Putin Won Crimea, and Lost Ukraine, SLATE (Oct. 18, 2016, 
9:15 AM), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/interrogation/2016/10/tim_judah_on_
how_putin_won_crimea_and_lost_ukraine.html [https://perma.cc/U3WD-22LZ] (discussing how 
the invasion of Crimea turned “millions” of Ukrainians against Russia). 
 59. See, e.g., Daniel Treisman, Why Putin Took Crimea, FOREIGN AFF., May/June 2016, at 
47, 48 (discussing Putin’s many motivations for the invasion); Leonid Bershidsky, Why Russia 
Stopped at Crimea, BLOOMBERGVIEW (Feb. 22, 2016, 12:20 PM), https://www.bloomberg.
com/view/articles/2016-02-22/why-russia-stopped-at-crimea [https://perma.cc/PB9C-8TB5] (“In 
Ukraine, [Putin] wants to cripple the country enough that the West will be wary of taking it in, 
integrating it into European institutions.”). 
 60. See Nina Khrushcheva, What Does Vladimir Putin Really Want in Ukraine?, REUTERS 
(Feb. 2, 2015), http://blogs.reuters.com/great-debate/2015/02/01/what-does-vladimir-putin-really-
want-in-ukraine [https://perma.cc/85FV-MKEW] (“Some political analysts assert that Putin is all 
about asymmetrical retaliation: Every time he feels his power is disrespected, he lashes out.”). 
 61. Adam Taylor, The UK’s Defense of the Falkland Islands Costs a Staggering Amount  
Per Islander, BUS. INSIDER (Feb. 14, 2012, 8:45 AM), http://www.businessinsider.com/falkland-
islands-cost-2012-2 [https://perma.cc/8AMY-KLUJ]. 
 62. Steven Swinford, Theresa May Extends Olive Branch to Argentina Over Falkland Islands, 
TELEGRAPH (Aug. 12, 2016, 1:22 AM), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/08/11/theresa-
may-asks-argentina-to-discuss-falklands-flights-and-oil [https://perma.cc/FZ9E-ZBGY]. 
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victory and stand as a symbol of martial courage and national pride.63 
Moreover, the ability to defend such a far-flung place demonstrates 
British national greatness to the world and serves as a reminder of the 
country’s former imperial reach.64 To sell the Falklands is to sell off 
British history and leave behind the graves of British soldiers who died 
defending the island. All of this should depress supporters of Blocher 
and Gulati’s scheme. If two wealthy Western countries (that share 
many of the same values) cannot agree to sell a group of islands that 
has no strategic significance and only contains a handful of settlements, 
it demonstrates how much work still needs to be done. 
CONCLUSION  
In A Market for Sovereign Control, Joseph Blocher and Mitu 
Gulati have accomplished something rare and vitally important. For 
the better part of the past century, international law has assumed that 
borders are inviolable, except in the most extreme cases. Blocher and 
Gulati disrupt this thinking by proposing to protect international 
boundaries with a liability rule rather than a property rule. Their case 
against the sanctity of borders is a powerful one, and they convincingly 
argue that where the people of a region are clearly denied equal rights 
they should have the ability to exit, provided they compensate their 
parent nation. Blocher and Gulati deserve plaudits because they are 
pushing for a way to bring functioning government to oppressed 
people, rather than forcing oppressed people to flee their homes in 
search of security.  
Unfortunately, the devil is in the details. And, right now, Blocher 
and Gulati’s alternative vision lacks concrete details in crucial areas. In 
other places, their framework borrows too heavily from law and 
economics concepts at the expense of more granular thinking about on-
the-ground political realities. Will the threat of a market for 
sovereignty really inspire rogues to treat disfavored regions with a 
lighter touch? Will bigger, stronger nations (China, Russia, the United 
States) really accede to any limits on their sovereignty? Is there any 
good evidence that offering monetary compensation for land can bury 
generations-long disputes about who owns contested territories? 
Against this background, perhaps the greatest virtue of Blocher and 
Gulati’s framework is that it might spark important debates between 
 
 63. WENDY WEBSTER, ENGLISHNESS AND EMPIRE 1939–1965, at 219–20 (2005) (discussing 
Margaret Thatcher and the memory of the Falklands War). 
 64. Id. 
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nations, shift norms about borders, and make transactions for 
sovereign territory more politically palatable.  
 
